without providing proof and when someone calls you on it you just wash,
rinse, repeat does not make what you say true - and it is not. Almost
to the point where I just delete your messages as being nothing but BS.
On 10/19/2010 01:43 PM, Tommy News wrote:
> The GOP created the meltdown, ignored the American people, started
> unwarranted wars, took us from a $236 billion dollar surplus to $1.3
> trillion dollar deficit, and now tells us they are the ones to fix it!
> Even though they have no plan!
>
> A return to the failed GOP Bush policies is no plan, which will only
> fail yet again.
>
> On 10/19/10, Keith In Tampa<keithintampa@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Yes, Tommy, the articles totally debunk the horse hockey that you wrote.
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 19, 2010 at 12:27 PM, Tommy News<tommysnews@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Thanks for all this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10/19/10, MJ<michaelj@america.net> wrote:
>>> > The Myth of Energy Deregulation
>>>
>>>> Monday, November 07, 2005
>>>> by Adam Summers
>>>>
>>>> While the initiatives on the upcoming November 8 California special
>>>>
>>> election
>>>
>>>> ballot backed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger have been receiving all
>>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> the media attention, another initiative that addresses an important
>>>> issue
>>>>
>>> is
>>>
>>>> being overlooked. Proposition 80, the so-called "Repeal of Electricity
>>>> Deregulation and Blackout Prevention" initiative, would make some
>>>> significant and detrimental changes in the state's energy policy.
>>>>
>>>> The fact that even a government regulatory body such as the California
>>>> Public Utilities Commission (PUC) is actually against a measure that
>>>>
>>> would
>>>
>>>> increase its regulatory powers should tell you something right off the
>>>>
>>> bat
>>>
>>>> about the merits of Prop. 80.
>>>>
>>>> California energy consumers are currently served by one of three types
>>>> of
>>>> providers: investor-owned utilities (IOUs), local publicly-owned
>>>> electric
>>>> utilities, and independent electric service providers (ESPs). Before the
>>>> state's "deregulation" experiment of the 1990s was suspended in 2001
>>>>
>>> during
>>>
>>>> California's energy crisis, customers could choose to purchase their
>>>> electricity services directly from ESPs through "direct access"
>>>>
>>> contracts,
>>>
>>>> rather than through an intermediary such as the local IOU or public
>>>>
>>> utility.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Proposition 80 Would Reduce Consumer Choice and Increase Costs
>>>>
>>>> Proposition 80 would permanently prevent all customers receiving
>>>>
>>> electricity
>>>
>>>> services from an IOU from switching to an ESP, effectively eliminating
>>>>
>>> any
>>>
>>>> new direct access (existing direct access contracts would be
>>>>
>>> grandfathered
>>>
>>>> in).[1] Thus, under Prop. 80, instead of having the option to buy
>>>> electricity directly from independent producers, consumers would have no
>>>> choice but to buy their electricity from utilities. By effectively
>>>> eliminating an entire class of providers, the state has stifled
>>>>
>>> competition
>>>
>>>> (and would continue to do so), thereby leading to higher prices and,
>>>>
>>> likely,
>>>
>>>> lower-quality service.
>>>>
>>>> The effect of this provision on prices would be significant. ESP
>>>>
>>> customers
>>>
>>>> include hospitals, local governments, the California State University
>>>> system, several University of California campuses, community college
>>>> districts, and local school districts. The nonpartisan Legislative
>>>>
>>> Analyst's
>>>
>>>> Office (LAO) estimates that the UC system alone saves about $12 million
>>>>
>>> per
>>>
>>>> year by purchasing its electricity from a lower-cost independent
>>>>
>>> provider.
>>>
>>>> According to Mike Florio, an attorney for The Utility Reform Network
>>>>
>>> (TURN,
>>>
>>>> one of the chief proponents of Prop. 80 that helped craft the measure),
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> ability of consumers to purchase electricity directly from independent
>>>> service providers "destabilizes the whole business … and we'll truly be
>>>>
>>> at
>>>
>>>> the mercy of the gods of the free market."[2] How dare people be able to
>>>> choose whom they want to do business with! I suppose TURN hired Mr.
>>>>
>>> Florio
>>>
>>>> not for his legal expertise, but rather by the sheer providence of the
>>>> "free-market gods."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Proposition 80 Would Impede Innovation and Efficiency
>>>>
>>>> Another provision of Prop. 80 would prohibit the broader implementation
>>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> "dynamic pricing" of electricity without the consent of the consumer.
>>>> Currently, all but the largest energy consumers pay a flat rate for
>>>> electricity that does not vary by the time of day. Clearly, energy use
>>>> is
>>>> not constant throughout the day, however. There are certain "peak" hours
>>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> the day when consumers use lots of electricity, and "non-peak" hours
>>>> when
>>>> they use very little. The costs of providing electricity vary
>>>>
>>> accordingly.
>>>
>>>> As such, the IOUs have submitted proposals to the PUC to charge all
>>>> consumers higher rates during peak hours and lower rates during non-peak
>>>> hours. This price discrimination would be accomplished through the use
>>>> of
>>>> high-tech "smart" meters.
>>>>
>>>> In addition to making good sense one should pay more for something
>>>> when
>>>>
>>> it
>>>
>>>> is in higher demand dynamic pricing would encourage conservation via
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> pricing mechanism. Dynamic pricing would be a more efficient system
>>>>
>>> because
>>>
>>>> higher prices would discourage some from consuming such a scarce
>>>> resource
>>>> while ensuring that those who place the highest value on energy use are
>>>> still able to consume it. Similarly, those who have some flexibility
>>>> over
>>>> when they consume their energy would be encouraged to utilize it during
>>>> non-peak hours, thus placing less strain on the system.
>>>>
>>>> Allowing the consumer to opt out of a dynamic pricing model would be
>>>> like
>>>> forcing a hotel owner to offer customers the choice of the nightly room
>>>>
>>> rate
>>>
>>>> or an average of the nightly room rates throughout the week. Since
>>>> significantly more people stay at hotels during the weekend, rates are
>>>>
>>> much
>>>
>>>> higher on Friday and Saturday nights. The average weekly rate, however,
>>>> would be higher than normal weekday rates but lower than normal weekend
>>>> rates. The cheaper "opt-out" weekend rates and higher weekday rates
>>>> would
>>>> encourage even more people to stay during the weekend and fewer to stay
>>>> during the week. The result would be a shortage of hotel rooms during
>>>> the
>>>> weekend and a loss of revenue for the hotel owner. No wonder demand
>>>>
>>> strains
>>>
>>>> the electrical grids during hot summer days.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Environmental Issues
>>>>
>>>> Under current regulations, energy producers must increase the portion of
>>>> energy derived from renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, and
>>>> hydroelectric by one percent per year until 2017, when 20 percent of
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> energy produced must come from these sources. Proposition 80 would
>>>> accelerate this deadline to 2010. Interestingly, some environmentalists
>>>> oppose Prop. 80 because a provision requiring a two-thirds vote of the
>>>> Legislature to amend the measure could make it more difficult to
>>>> increase
>>>> the renewable energy standard in the future.
>>>>
>>>> According to the LAO's analysis, Prop. 80 would also require that "the
>>>>
>>> first
>>>
>>>> priority for IOUs in procuring new electricity is to be from
>>>> 'cost-effective' energy efficiency and conservation programs, followed
>>>> by
>>>> 'cost-effective' renewable resources, and then from traditional sources
>>>>
>>> such
>>>
>>>> as fossil fuel burning power plants."[3] Of course, if renewable energy
>>>> sources and energy efficiency and conservation programs were truly "cost
>>>> effective," producers would already be utilizing them in higher numbers
>>>> because it would make them more profitable. This clearly is not the
>>>> case.
>>>> Forcing companies to invest significant amounts of their scarce
>>>> resources
>>>>
>>> on
>>>
>>>> more costly energy-production methods, which make up a relatively small
>>>> share of total energy production (for good reason), will only ensure
>>>> that
>>>> costs and, ultimately, consumers' electricity bills remain higher
>>>>
>>> than
>>>
>>>> necessary.
>>>>
>>>> As new technologies and energy-production methods are developed, this
>>>> may
>>>> change, but for now, it is best for both producers and consumers to
>>>> focus
>>>>
>>> on
>>>
>>>> the most efficient means of producing energy. Of course, if consumers
>>>>
>>> demand
>>>
>>>> "cleaner" energy, in a truly free market, producers will have an
>>>>
>>> incentive
>>>
>>>> to provide it. Indeed, after Pennsylvania successfully implemented its
>>>> electricity deregulation effort in 1999 (without the pitfalls
>>>> experienced
>>>>
>>> by
>>>
>>>> California), 20 percent of consumers chose to switch to suppliers of
>>>>
>>> "green
>>>
>>>> power," despite the fact that they had to pay a small premium to do so.
>>>> Proposition 80 eliminates this choice, instead demanding that all
>>>>
>>> consumers
>>>
>>>> support the higher cost of investing more in renewable energy whether
>>>>
>>> they
>>>
>>>> want to
>>>> or not.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Misconceptions Over Electricity "Deregulation" in California
>>>>
>>>> Some blame deregulation for the rolling blackouts, soaring spot market
>>>> prices, and utility bankruptcies that sprang from the energy crisis of
>>>>
>>> 2000
>>>
>>>> and 2001. But this anger is misplaced. California has never experienced
>>>>
>>> true
>>>
>>>> deregulation. The "deregulation" implemented in 1996 left price controls
>>>>
>>> in
>>>
>>>> place and created "artificial" markets ripe for manipulation and
>>>>
>>> disparities
>>>
>>>> between supply and demand.
>>>>
>>>> By setting price caps below market prices, California limited the
>>>> profitability of the industry. When wholesale energy costs increased,
>>>> the
>>>> price caps prevented energy producers from passing them on to consumers.
>>>> Wholesale prices rose dramatically for a number of reasons: natural gas
>>>> prices rose, hot weather in the Southwest increased demand, a relative
>>>>
>>> lack
>>>
>>>> of water in the Northwest minimized the production of hydroelectric
>>>>
>>> energy,
>>>
>>>> and pollution-control permits, which allow industrial companies that
>>>>
>>> produce
>>>
>>>> less pollution than allowed by regulations to sell the difference as
>>>> "credits" to higher-pollution-producing companies, rose ten-fold, from
>>>> $4
>>>>
>>> to
>>>
>>>> $40.
>>>>
>>>> The price caps additionally discouraged potential producers from
>>>> entering
>>>> the market and increasing competition, and they discouraged existing
>>>> producers from investing profits in adding capacity, of which
>>>>
>>> Californians
>>>
>>>> were (and continue to be) in dire need. As a result of the price caps
>>>> and
>>>> pressure from politicians and environmentalists, the building of plants
>>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>> transmission lines slowed dramatically and energy producers were not
>>>> able
>>>>
>>> to
>>>
>>>> keep up with demand, particularly in the Silicon Valley, where the
>>>>
>>> booming
>>>
>>>> computer and "dot-com" industries led to even sharper increases in
>>>> electricity demand.
>>>>
>>>> After the big three investor-owned utilities Pacific Gas& Electric,
>>>> Southern California Edison, and SEMPRA (San Diego Gas& Electric) were
>>>> forced to sell many of their fossil-fuel-burning generators to private
>>>> firms, regulators prohibited them from entering into long-term contracts
>>>> with these firms, forcing them to rely upon the much more volatile
>>>> short-term and spot markets. In addition, California forced generators
>>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>> utilities to trade power through the Power Exchange, a state-run pool.
>>>>
>>>> While that requirement was designed to give every company the same
>>>>
>>> wholesale
>>>
>>>> price for power, it also guaranteed that they would be unable to
>>>>
>>> negotiate
>>>
>>>> lower-priced power on their own. The California rules essentially barred
>>>> utilities from buying power on the futures market, meaning they were
>>>>
>>> unable
>>>
>>>> to lock in supplies and prices.[4]
>>>>
>>>> This is as if Wal-Mart and Marshall Field's were forced to acquire their
>>>> goods from a non-profit, state-run pool that would guarantee that they
>>>>
>>> would
>>>
>>>> acquire the goods for the same price. Wal-Mart never would have been
>>>> able
>>>>
>>> to
>>>
>>>> develop its efficient and innovative purchasing and distribution system,
>>>> meaning it could not generate savings to pass on to customers in the
>>>> form
>>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> lower prices.
>>>>
>>>> At the time of the increase in wholesale prices, PG&E and Edison were
>>>>
>>> still
>>>
>>>> in the deregulation "transition" period, and thus still subject to PUC
>>>>
>>> rate
>>>
>>>> regulations. As a result, PG&E went bankrupt and Edison teetered on the
>>>>
>>> edge
>>>
>>>> of insolvency. To add insult to injury, when the government stepped in
>>>> to
>>>> purchase electricity on behalf of the struggling IOUs to try to quell
>>>> the
>>>> crisis, not only did it do so at the height of the emergency, when
>>>> energy
>>>> prices were highest, it locked in these prices with long-term contracts
>>>> costing billions of dollars.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Natural Monopoly Justification for Regulation
>>>>
>>>> The main argument against the full privatization of public utilities
>>>> such
>>>>
>>> as
>>>
>>>> electricity and water service is that such industries are "natural
>>>> monopolies." That is, they require such high fixed costs (it is easier
>>>> to
>>>> start a new restaurant than to invest in the infrastructure for a new
>>>> electric grid) that it is inefficient for there to exist more than one
>>>> producer in a particular location. This, it is feared, will lead the
>>>> producer to engage in price gouging.
>>>>
>>>> There are several problems with this rationale, not the least of which
>>>> is
>>>> the notion that "public utilities" somehow constitute a unique set of
>>>>
>>> goods
>>>
>>>> that must be "protected" by government intervention. As economist Murray
>>>> Rothbard noted in Power and Market:
>>>>
>>>> The very term "public utility" … is an absurd one. Every good is useful
>>>>
>>> "to
>>>
>>>> the public," and almost every good … may be considered "necessary." Any
>>>> designation of a few industries as "public utilities" is completely
>>>> arbitrary and unjustified.[5]
>>>>
>>>> High capital costs certainly will limit the number of actual and
>>>>
>>> potential
>>>
>>>> providers, but there is still a profit motive in a free market that
>>>>
>>> creates
>>>
>>>> opportunities for lower-cost producers. In addition, it is important to
>>>>
>>> note
>>>
>>>> that markets are not static; technological innovations may allow for
>>>> additional competition in the future.
>>>>
>>>> Another misconception opponents of free markets have concerns the very
>>>> understanding of the nature of competition. Even if there is only one
>>>> producer of a certain good or service in town, this does not mean that
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> producer is "gouging" customers through monopolistic practices. Indeed,
>>>>
>>> just
>>>
>>>> because he is the sole supplier today does not mean he will be the sole
>>>> supplier tomorrow. As economist Thomas J. DiLorenzo explains:
>>>>
>>>> If competition is viewed as a dynamic, rivalrous process of
>>>> entrepreneurship, then the fact that a single producer happens to have
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> lowest costs at any one point in time is of little or no consequence.
>>>> The
>>>> enduring forces of competition including potential competition will
>>>> render free-market monopoly an impossibility.[6]
>>>>
>>>> In other words, even if there happens to be only one current provider of
>>>>
>>> a
>>>
>>>> particular good or service, in a free market that provider is held in
>>>>
>>> check
>>>
>>>> by the mere threat of competition if he charges prices that are too
>>>>
>>> high
>>>
>>>> or provides poor service, there will be an incentive for a competitor to
>>>> come in and take market share from him by offering lower prices or
>>>> better
>>>> service.
>>>>
>>>> The rules change, however, when government regulation erects barriers to
>>>> entry or otherwise suppresses competition. In addition to the many
>>>> government regulations purportedly enacted in the "public interest,"
>>>>
>>> there
>>>
>>>> are numerous instances where private-sector businesses have been able to
>>>> successfully lobby policymakers to use the power of government to
>>>>
>>> establish
>>>
>>>> barriers to competition and protect them from existing or potential
>>>>
>>> rivals.
>>>
>>>> Unlike the free-market case, there is no possibility of these
>>>> monopolists
>>>> losing out to lower-cost providers (barring the elimination of the
>>>> regulations), and they are able to "exploit" consumers. These are the
>>>>
>>> truly
>>>
>>>> harmful monopolies. Thus, the only "bad" monopoly is a
>>>> government-created
>>>>
>>> or
>>>
>>>> government-preserved
>>>> monopoly.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Conclusions
>>>>
>>>> Proposition 80 would be a step backward for California. It would
>>>> restrict
>>>> consumer choice, discourage competition, and impose more of the kinds of
>>>> regulations that got the California power industry into trouble in the
>>>>
>>> first
>>>
>>>> place.
>>>>
>>>> As awful as Proposition 80 is, however, there is good news. It is
>>>>
>>> trailing
>>>
>>>> in recent public opinion polls, and even if it should end up passing it
>>>>
>>> is
>>>
>>>> likely to be discarded by the courts. It was removed from the ballot on
>>>>
>>> July
>>>
>>>> 22 by the Court of Appeals in Sacramento because the court found that,
>>>> according to the state constitution, the PUC's authority can only be
>>>> increased by the Legislature, not by initiative. The initiative was
>>>>
>>> restored
>>>
>>>> a few days later by the California Supreme Court, which did not offer an
>>>> opinion on the merits of the case but felt that the public should have
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> chance to vote on the initiative before the legal challenge is heard.
>>>> (Of
>>>> course, if voters reject the measure, this will be a moot point and the
>>>> courts will not have to waste their time on it a fact that surely was
>>>>
>>> not
>>>
>>>> lost on the Supreme Court.)
>>>>
>>>> Politicians and regulators forced a sham of a "deregulation" scheme upon
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> energy industry in California, and then blamed the free market when it
>>>> inevitably failed! The problem was not too much free-market competition;
>>>>
>>> it
>>>
>>>> was too much regulation (despite the "deregulation" doublespeak). The
>>>>
>>> real
>>>
>>>> solution to California's energy problem is to eliminate price caps and
>>>>
>>> all
>>>
>>>> government regulation, thereby removing barriers to entry, fostering
>>>> competition, offering consumers maximum choice, and affording providers
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> greatest incentives to increase capacity and best serve their customers.
>>>>
>>>> Adam Summers is a policy analyst for the Reason Foundation
>>>> (asummers1@san.rr.com). Comment on the blog.
>>>>
>>>> [1] This option was suspended during the electricity crisis of 2000 and
>>>> 2001, but is scheduled to be reinstated when the last of the power
>>>>
>>> contracts
>>>
>>>> signed on behalf of the IOUs by the Department of Water Resources
>>>> expires
>>>>
>>> in
>>>
>>>> 2015.
>>>>
>>>> [2] Carrie Peyton Dahlberg, "Electricity proposition crackles: Will
>>>>
>>> prices
>>>
>>>> go up? Will it avert an energy crisis? It all depends on who's talking,"
>>>> Sacramento Bee, October 15, 2005,
>>>> http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/13717834p-14560232c.html(free
>>>> registration required).
>>>>
>>>> [3] California Secretary of State, Official Voter Information Guide,
>>>> Statewide Special Election, November 8, 2005, p. 52,
>>>> http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/entire80.pdf .
>>>>
>>>> [4] Terry Maxon, "Power Woes Unlikely in Texas, Officials Say," Dallas
>>>> Morning News, January 19, 2001, cited in Lynne Kiesling, "Getting
>>>> Electricity Deregulation Right: How Other States and Nations Have
>>>> Avoided
>>>> California's Mistakes," Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 281, April
>>>>
>>> 2001,
>>>
>>>> p. 18, http://www.reason.org/ps281.pdf.
>>>>
>>>> [5] Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and the Economy,
>>>> (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977), p. 76,
>>>> http://mises.org/rothbard/power&market.pdf. Now integrated into Man,
>>>> Economy, and State.
>>>>
>>>> [6] Thomas J. DiLorenzo, "The Myth of Natural Monopoly," The Review of
>>>> Austrian Economics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1996), p. 44,
>>>> http://mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/rae9_2_3.pdf.
>>>>
>>>> http://mises.org/daily/1954
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups.
>>>> For options& help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum
>>>>
>>>> * Visit our other community at
>>>> http://www.PoliticalForum.com/<http://www.politicalforum.com/>
>>>> * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls.
>>>> * Read the latest breaking news, and more.
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Together, we can change the world, one mind at a time.
>>> Have a great day,
>>> Tommy
>>>
>>> --
>>> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups.
>>> For options& help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum
>>>
>>> * Visit our other community at
>>> http://www.PoliticalForum.com/<http://www.politicalforum.com/>
>>> * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls.
>>> * Read the latest breaking news, and more.
>>>
>>>
>> --
>> Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups.
>> For options& help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum
>>
>> * Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/
>> * It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls.
>> * Read the latest breaking news, and more.
>>
>
>
--
Thanks for being part of "PoliticalForum" at Google Groups.
For options & help see http://groups.google.com/group/PoliticalForum
* Visit our other community at http://www.PoliticalForum.com/
* It's active and moderated. Register and vote in our polls.
* Read the latest breaking news, and more.
No comments:
Post a Comment