Published: June 13, 2010 There are not a lot of good weeks in Afghanistan. But last week was particularly bad. At least 26 American or NATO soldiers were killed in attacks by insurgents. The commanding general, Stanley McChrystal, announced that his long promised offensive in the Taliban's home base of Kandahar would be delayed for months. Then The Times reported that Afghan officials say President Hamid Karzai is trying to strike a secret deal with the Taliban and Pakistan and doubts that the Americans and NATO can ever defeat the insurgents. General McChrystal's counterinsurgency strategy still seems like the best chance to stabilize Afghanistan and get American troops home. His aim is to push militants out of key cities and towns and quickly build up effective local governments so residents have the incentive and means to help stop extremists from returning. That theory ran into harsh reality the first time General McChrystal tried to apply it, in the city of Marja, a lesser Taliban stronghold. Four months after American troops drove fighters out of Marja's center, there is no functioning government, international aid programs lag, and the Taliban are coming back. A surge of assassinations of local officials in Marja and Kandahar has made Afghans all the more fearful about cooperating with the Americans and their own government. We have not seen a full assessment of the Marja operation. General McChrystal said that he now plans to spend more time in Kandahar cultivating local support, improving public services and building up local governance. Building competent Afghan army and police forces has clearly proved far harder than expected. The same is true for fostering and protecting honest and committed Afghan officials. Western officials and experts also say that the American military found it hard to read — and in some instances they misread — the complex tribal and societal relationships in both places. Nearly nine years after the Americans arrived in Afghanistan, American intelligence agencies, civilian and military, seem to be flying blind. That is intolerable. Then there is the fundamental question of whether President Karzai can — or is interested in — building an effective government. Mr. Karzai got what he wanted from a recent national peace conference — a mandate to appoint a government commission to begin talks with the Taliban. That makes reports that he is trying to cut a private deal especially worrying. We are also very concerned about his decision to force the resignation of two top security officials. Both were seen as competent and honest. And we found it bizarre that Mr. Karzai is telling aides that he believed the United States, and not the Taliban, might have been responsible for a rocket attack on the conference in Kabul. The Americans still haven't figured out how to manage Mr. Karzai. Reviving a public fight with him isn't going to work, but they need to make clear that there's a limit to American patience — and that they will only support peace talks that have a specific set of red lines. The basic civil rights of Afghans — particularly women and girls — cannot be up for negotiation. There can be no place in Afghanistan for Al Qaeda or the Taliban's worst abusers. It is way too soon for Mr. Karzai to be pushing to remove the Taliban from the United Nations terrorist blacklist. We don't know if the Taliban leaders will ever compromise. But we are sure that they will consider it only under duress. General McChrystal is going to have to do a much better job in Kandahar. Mr. Karzai is going to have to drop his illusions and commit to the fight. |
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