Dear J. Ashley: Hating government won't solve the problems. Making
government be respectful of civil liberties, deferential to the
People; efficient, and unobtrusive WILL solve the problems! — J. A.
A. —
>
On Jun 5, 11:49 am, Jonathan Ashley <
jonathanashle...@lavabit.com>
wrote:
> John,
>
> There were folks as early as 1787 who knew that the coming government
> would result in tyranny. By presenting YOUR Article III of YOUR New
> Constitution you demonstrate that things would not be better under YOUR
> New Constitution, but would instead fall deeper (if that's possible)
> into the hands of "our monarchical, aristocratical democracy."
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> The Antifederalist Papers No. 9
> A Consolidated Government is a Tyranny
>
> "MONTEZUMA," regarded as a Pennsylvanian, wrote this essay which showed
> up in the Independent Gazetteer on October 17, 1787.
>
> We the Aristocratic party of the United States, lamenting the many
> inconveniences to which the late confederation subjected the well-born,
> the better kind of people, bringing them down to the level of the
> rabble-and holding in utter detestation that frontispiece to every bill
> of rights, "that all men are born equal"-beg leave (for the purpose of
> drawing a line between such as we think were ordained to govern, and
> such as were made to bear the weight of government without having any
> share in its administration) to submit to our Friends in the first class
> for their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical,
> aristocratical democracy.
>
> lst. As a majority of all societies consist of men who (though totally
> incapable of thinking or acting in governmental matters) are more
> readily led than driven, we have thought meet to indulge them in
> something like a democracy in the new constitution, which part we have
> designated by the popular name of the House of Representatives. But to
> guard against every possible danger from this lower house, we have
> subjected every bill they bring forward, to the double negative of our
> upper house and president. Nor have we allowed the populace the right to
> elect their representatives annually . . . lest this body should be too
> much under the influence and control of their constituents, and thereby
> prove the "weatherboard of our grand edifice, to show the shiftings of
> every fashionable gale,"-for we have not yet to learn that little else
> is wanting to aristocratize the most democratical representative than to
> make him somewhat independent of his political creators. We have taken
> away that rotation of appointment which has so long perplexed us-that
> grand engine of popular influence. Every man is eligible into our
> government from time to time for life. This will have a two-fold good
> effect. First, it prevents the representatives from mixing with the
> lower class, and imbibing their foolish sentiments, with which they
> would have come charged on re-election.
>
> 2d. They will from the perpetuality of office be under our eye, and in a
> short time will think and act like us, independently of popular whims
> and prejudices. For the assertion "that evil communications corrupt good
> manners," is not more true than its reverse. We have allowed this house
> the power to impeach, but we have tenaciously reserved the right to try.
> We hope gentlemen, you will see the policy of this clause-for what
> matters it who accuses, if the accused is tried by his friends. In fine,
> this plebian house will have little power, and that little be rightly
> shaped by our house of gentlemen, who will have a very extensive
> influence-from their being chosen out of the genteeler class ... It is
> true, every third senatorial seat is to be vacated duennually, but
> two-thirds of this influential body will remain in office, and be ready
> to direct or (if necessary) bring over to the good old way, the young
> members, if the old ones should not be returned. And whereas many of our
> brethren, from a laudable desire to support their rank in life above the
> commonalty, have not only deranged their finances, but subjected their
> persons to indecent treatment (as being arrested for debt, etc.) we have
> framed a privilege clause, by which they may laugh at the fools who
> trusted them. But we have given out, that this clause was provided, only
> that the members might be able without interruption, to deliberate on
> the important business of their country.
>
> We have frequently endeavored to effect in our respective states, the
> happy discrimination which pervades this system; but finding we could
> not bring the states into it individually, we have determined ... and
> have taken pains to leave the legislature of each free and independent
> state, as they now call themselves, in such a situation that they will
> eventually be absorbed by our grand continental vortex, or dwindle into
> petty corporations, and have power over little else than yoaking hogs or
> determining the width of cart wheels. But (aware that an intention to
> annihilate state legislatures, would be objected to our favorite scheme)
> we have made their existence (as a board of electors) necessary to ours.
> This furnishes us and our advocates with a fine answer to any clamors
> that may be raised on this subject. We have so interwoven continental
> and state legislatures that they cannot exist separately; whereas we in
> truth only leave them the power of electing us, for what can a
> provincial legislature do when we possess the exclusive regulation of
> external and internal commerce, excise, duties, imposts, post-offices
> and roads; when we and we alone, have the power to wage war, make peace,
> coin money (if we can get bullion) if not, borrow money, organize the
> militia and call them forth to execute our decrees, and crush
> insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod,
> which we have the power of raising and keeping even in the time of
> peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states,
> when we are armed with such powers, with a president at our head? (A
> name we thought proper to adopt in conformity to the prejudices of a
> silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican government, that
> we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to them, in order more
> effectually to secure the substance of our proposed plan; but we all
> know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector). I repeat
> it, what have we to fear armed with such powers, with a president at our
> head who is captain- -general of the army, navy and militia of the
> United States, who can make and unmake treaties, appoint and commission
> ambassadors and other ministers, who can grant or refuse reprieves or
> pardons, who can make judges of the supreme and other continental
> courts-in short, who will be the source, the fountain of honor, profit
> and power, whose influence like the rays of the sun, will diffuse itself
> far and wide, will exhale all democratical vapors and break the clouds
> of popular insurrection? But again gentlemen, our judicial power is a
> strong work, a masked battery, few people see the guns we can and will
> ere long play off from it. For the judicial power embraces every
> question which can arise in law or equity, under this constitution and
> under the laws of "the United States" (which laws will be, you know, the
> supreme laws of the land). This power extends to all cases, affecting
> ambassadors or other public ministers, "and consuls; to all cases of
> admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the
> United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more
> States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens
> of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands
> under grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens
> thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects."
>
> Now, can a question arise in the colonial courts, which the ingenuity or
> sophistry of an able lawyer may not bring within one or other of the
> above cases? Certainly not. Then our court will have original or
> appellate jurisdiction in all cases-and if so, how fallen are state
> judicatures-and must not every provincial law yield to our supreme flat?
> Our constitution answers yes. . . . And finally we shall entrench
> ourselves so as to laugh at the cabals of the commonalty. A few
> regiments will do at first; it must be spread abroad that they are
> absolutely necessary to defend the frontiers. Now a regiment and then a
> legion must be added quietly; by and by a frigate or two must be built,
> still taking care to intimate that they are essential to the support of
> our revenue laws and to prevent smuggling. We have said nothing about a
> bill of rights, for we viewed it as an eternal clog upon our designs, as
> a lock chain to the wheels of government-though, by the way, as we have
> not insisted on rotation in our offices, the simile of a wheel is ill.
> We have for some time considered the freedom of the press as a great
> evil-it spreads information, and begets a licentiousness in the people
> which needs the rein more than the spur; besides, a daring printer may
> expose the plans of government and lessen the consequence of our
> president and senate-for these and many other reasons we have said
> nothing with respect to the "right of the people to speak and publish
> their sentiments" or about their "palladiums of liberty" and such stuff.
> We do not much like that sturdy privilege of the people-the right to
> demand the writ of habeas corpus. We have therefore reserved the power
> of refusing it in cases of rebellion, and you know we are the judges of
> what is rebellion.... Our friends we find have been assiduous in
> representing our federal calamities, until at length the people at
> large-frightened by the gloomy picture on one side, and allured by the
> prophecies of some of our fanciful and visionary adherents on the
> other-are ready to accept and confirm our proposed government without
> the delay or forms of examination--which was the more to be wished, as
> they are wholly unfit to investigate the principles or pronounce on the
> merit of so exquisite a system. Impressed with a conviction that this
> constitution is calculated to restrain the ...
>
> read more »
--
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