The Outsiders: Russia and Turkey in the Greater Europe

By Richard Sakwa, Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent at Canterbury, an Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House

European international relations are now entering a period of flux as the legacy of the cold war wanes, and the 'outsider' countries, notably Russia and Turkey, are rethinking their mutual relations as well as their place in the world. The current stalemate in Russia's relations with the European Union is accompanied by a broader impasse in the global role and status of both Russia and the EU, while Turkey's aspirations to enter the EU remain contested both at home and abroad. In this context new ideas are emerging that offer a way out of the current stagnation. Notable among them are neo-revisionist Russian ideas about a 'greater Europe', shared in part by Turkish thinkers, suggesting a new vision of continent-wide European unity that transcends traditional interpretations of the insider/outsider dialectic. At the institutional level this is accompanied by a revival of 'pan-European' integrative ideas, including a restructuring of European security and the creation of a 'union of Europe' encompassing the EU, Russia, Turkey and others as equal members of a new political community.

Integrative projects in Europe have reached a plateau, and in some aspects there has been a noticeable decline. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty within the European Union (EU) represented a significant watering down of the ambitions vested in drafts of the European constitution that it came to replace. Russia's relations with the EU are characterised by a lukewarm embrace that at times becomes a chilly estrangement. No common language or common purpose has been found in relations between the two. The enlargement agenda is no longer the focus of relations with contiguous countries, and although there will be some continued enlargement, notably in the Balkans, the emphasis has shifted to managing relations with neighbours. The prospects of Turkish membership are receding, while the EU aspirations of Ukraine and other eastern European countries have been placed on indefinite hold.

The outsiders 

The notion of 'outsiders' is increasingly used in the literature to describe the uncomfortable position that Russia and Turkey, and to a lesser extent Ukraine, Belarus and other 'in between' countries, find themselves in the broader process of European integration. However, the language of outsiders makes a number of assumptions about the character of the dynamics of European politics that are increasingly questioned, not least by the putative outsiders themselves. Russia and Turkey have become the core of a new category of 'outsiders', but this is no longer simply a group based on exclusion but one which has elements of a voluntary character. The notion of outsiders, assumes that there are insiders. Clearly today membership of the EU is the great prize and the token of becoming a core member of Europe, but a new pattern of alliances and orientations is beginning to emerge. We often think of Europe in terms of concentric rings, but that is precisely the model that is now being challenged. New patterns of the insider/outside dialectic challenge EU-centric representations of political and geopolitical reality in the greater European space.

Deeper patterns of European history are beginning to reassert themselves against the integrationist agendas of the post-cold war era, and even the patterns of European politics as they took shape during the cold war are losing their power. Turkey for example has been a member of NATO since 1952, so in terms of security was clearly an insider in the post-war era, yet today in relative prestige terms, NATO is no longer quite what it was and Turkey is reverting to its classic 'outsider' status. This of course is nothing like the exclusion of earlier eras, and Turkey enjoys strong customs and other relations with the EU and other European institutions.

Russia's status as an outsider is rather less contested. It is a member of neither of the EU or NATO, and does not look likely to join either organisation in the foreseeable future. More than that, its relationship with both is laced with suspicions, threat perceptions and fears. Negotiations to frame the successor to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), which formally expired in December 2007, have advanced with tortuous circumspection, and for long there was no basic agreement on what the new treaty should be called. There are limits to Russia's outsiderness, however, and Russia remains a member of the Council of Europe (CoE), and in civilisational terms, considers itself closer to certain representations of Europe than Turkey. At the same time as Turkey's EU membership negotiations entered the doldrums, even the most optimistic of views of Russo-EU relations spoke of a partnership that would enjoy everything except shared institutions. This would at most entail a visa-free regime (in other words, an extended Schengen zone) and a common economic space reinforced by a free trade zone, but with few expectations that this would lead to the creation of some sort of new political community.

A new marginality?

While the Russians now talk of 'greater Europe', this is taking place precisely at a time when the continent as a whole is becoming a 'lesser Europe'. When the idea of a European constitution was first mooted it was intended to provide a formal framework for European ascendancy. However, the bruising experience followed by the adoption of the rather modest Lisbon Treaty appears now to be a response to relative decline. The Lisbon Treaty, moreover, appears to have done little to remove confusion about leadership in domestic and foreign policy in the EU. Although the EU has a total combined GDP equal to that of the United States ($14.5 trillion), its strategic marginalisation derives not just from a lack of unity but also from the absence of common resolve. Both Russia and the EU begin to suspect that they are on a relative downward slope in terms of global power, and that the continent as a whole is in danger of being marginalised. 

Towards a greater Europe

The ambiguities and tensions in the relationship have prompted Russia to try to shift the parameters of the discussion. For most of the post-cold war period the terms of engagement between Russia and Europe were established by Brussels and the west European powers, or so it seemed in Russian perceptions. From the late Putin period there were attempts to shift the terrain of discussion in a way that would equalise the basis for relations. The various concrete proposals that have emerged on this basis are epiphenomena of this ontological shift, and it is for this reason that they appear too often rudimentary and even ill-considered. As far as the elite are considered, the reassertion of Russia's status as an existential equal is as important as any of its concrete manifestations.

New ideas are emerging to reinterpret and broaden the definition of what it means to be European, which at the same time change the relationship between insiders and outsiders. The first of these ideas is the notion of greater Europe. Like many of Russia's neo-revisionist ideas, the notion remains little more than a vague aspiration and an ideal than a developed programme. Yet it does provide some indications of an alternative model of European politics. If the EU's integration project is based on conditionality, Russia's approach to non-accession states repudiates conditionality as a mechanism.

The idea of greater Europe is accompanied by revived ideas of pan-Europe. The failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s was countered by the establishment of the supranational European Coal and Steel Community by the Treaty of Paris ion 18 April 1951, and today the debate over a new security treaty for Europe reprises some of the themes of the earlier discussion, but this time on a pan-European scale. The debate also harks back to Gorbachev's idea of a common European home advanced during perestroika, sentiments echoed by François Mitterand. The idea of greater Europe, it must be stressed, is not the same as pan-Europe. Discussion of greater Europe focuses on ideas and the expression of the abstract ideal of European commonality and unity, whereas pan-Europe is more of an institutions based project.

The pan-European dimension is one that is increasingly mooted as a possible framework for both Russia and Turkey. This is a half-way house: providing some sort of institutional framework for ideas of greater Europe; but falling short of a fully-fledged supranational transformative agenda. For Russia this means integration without accession, something that may in the long-run provide a framework also for Turkey's relations with the EU. This was made explicit in Nicolas Sarkozy's European Parliament election speech in Nîmes on 5 May 2009. He spoke against Turkey's accession to the EU, arguing that Turkey 'is not intended to become an EU member', but Ankara should nevertheless be linked to the EU in both economic and security terms. In a significant innovation, he placed Russia and Turkey on an equal footing, noting that both countries should establish 'an economic and security common area' with the EU. A new bloc would thus be created 'of 800 million people who share the same prosperity and security' (Nicholas Sarkozy, 'Discours de M. le Président de la République', Nîmes, 5 May 2009, Elysée.fr.)

This is a visionary idea and offers a prospect not only for integrating Russia and Turkey with Europe, but also a way for Europe to redefine itself. The old European integration model is exhausted, in which Europe sets itself up as a proto-great power bloc that would in that form inevitably come into confrontation with Russia and, possibly, with America and China as well. Instead various configurations of pan-Europe are possible. One of these is the creation of a grand 'Pan-Eurasian Union' in which the EU, Russia, Turkey and other 'outsiders' would join as equal sovereign powers but in which a supranational Eurasian Commission would be created. In the first instance this would be concerned with managing a pan-Eurasian energy system, reconciling the interests of producers and consumers, but in due course 'spillover' into other sectors could be anticipated. A genuine energy partnership could serve as the foundations of an integrative process akin to the role played by the European Coal and Steel Community of the early 1950s.

A grand bargain in the present circumstances is unlikely, since both sides are too firmly embedded in their present stance of 'coexistence'. What is needed is a discussion that recognises the dangers of a competitive dynamic becoming consolidated in Eurasia. Already the development of the Eastern Partnership from May 2009, however benign in intention, provoked renewed fears about the clash of 'near abroads' in the new 'lands in-between'. To overcome this competitive dynamic the grand bargain proposed by Bordachëv needs to be complemented by a grand vision – the establishment of a Eurasian Union. This Union would have a type of Commission, beginning with relatively limited powers but establishing a dynamic of supranationalism. Intergovernmental arrangements are helpful, but the genius of Jean Monnet and the early European founding fathers was the understanding that this was not enough. The accumulation and preservation of sovereignty is an understandable process, but a counter-dynamic is required to ensure that our continent is not once again plunged into war.

Conclusion

Russia's discussion of greater Europe and pan-Europe is an attempt to transcend the competitive logic of a divided Europe, while retaining distinctive spheres of interest. However, Russia's refusal to accept the logic on which western European integration was based, the view that diplomacy between nation-states is not enough and needed to be accompanied by the dismantling of sovereignty in selected areas, means that unresolved tensions remain in its project of a greater Europe. Some common pooling of sovereignty, in energy and some other selected sectors, would represent precisely the first step in a transformational European policy that its neo-revisionist critique of the existing order demands. But new ideas are emerging to reinterpret and broaden the definition of what it means to be European, changing insider/outsider dynamics. The idea of greater Europe provides both Russia and Turkey to escape from the burden of history and marginality, and to create a positive post-enlargement agenda of European inclusion. Schemes to give pan-European aspirations concrete form offer a way of making the greater Europe once again a great Europe.

http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20100527/159182522.html